期刊瀏覽

共有 3 篇符合條件的文章
Nathan F. Batto(鮑彤),中央研究院政治學研究所助研究員。
Partisan Politics and Redistricting in Taiwan, 2005-2007 (in English)(政黨政治與選區重劃:臺灣經驗(2005-2007年)) 文章下載
* 本篇電子檔下載次數:34
顯示摘要
詳細內容
This paper examines partisan politics in the redistricting process in Taiwan in 2005-2007 to explain why neither major party was able to obtain its best plan in every city or county. Theoretically, the degree of partisanship depends on the extent to which guidelines constrain decision makers, the partisan composition of decision making bodies, and the sequence of action. In this specific case, there were four stages. Redistricting plans went through local election commissions, the Central Election Commission, the legislature, and negotiations between the speaker and the premier. At each stage, the effects of the guidelines, composition, and sequence are considered in detail. In addition, three counties are examined, illustrating the three common patterns: consensus, dominance by the local election commission, and partisan conflict. From a public policy standpoint, the framework presented in this paper provides a way to assess how various reform proposals would alter the incentive and constraints facing various actors. Politically, the framework suggests how future redistricting may differ from the 2005-2007 round, especially if Taiwan has unified government.

本文檢視臺灣在 2005-2007年選區重劃過程中的政黨政治,分析國民黨、民進黨兩大黨為何無法在各縣市通過對他們最有利的重劃版本。理論上,選區重劃案的政黨色彩,某種程度取決於法令規定對決策者、決策機構的黨派組成及行動順序的限制。以本研究個案來說,選區重劃案必須經過四個階段:首先為縣市選舉委員會,其次是中選會,第三為立法院,最後是立法院長與行政院長的協商。本文於每階段一一考量有關法令約制、決策機關組成和行動順序的細節內涵與效果。此外,本文檢視彰化縣、臺中縣與屏東縣例子,以說明共識型、地方選委會優勢型、政黨衝突型等三種選區重劃常見的型態。就公共行政而言,本文的分析架構提供一種評估不同改革案的方式。就政治發展的角度來說,此分析架構推論,未來選區重劃時本文指出的關鍵因素若有所改變,尤其若臺灣出現一致政府而非分立政府,則其過程與結果或許將相當不同於 2005-2007年的案例。
鮑彤,中央研究院政治學研究所助研究員。
Partisan and Personal Voting in SNTV: A Mixed Logit Model (in Englsih)(單記非讓渡投票選舉制度下的個人與政黨取向:一個混合洛基模型) 文章下載
* 本篇電子檔下載次數:14
顯示摘要
詳細內容
There are reasons to believe that both partisan and personal factors should be important in the voting decision in SNTV elections, but this has not been rigorously tested in previous literature. This paper presents evidence that both types of factors have significant impacts, but partisan factors are much more powerful than personal factors. In general, partisan factors dominate the candidate vote choice, and personal factors serve primarily as tiebreakers among candidates from the same party. Moreover, the importance that voters place on personal factors varies in different partisan contexts, and there is generally a partisan logic to these varying weights.

Methodologically, this paper proposes mixed logit as an appropriate tool for modeling voting choices in SNTV and examines data from the five legislative elections in Taiwan from 1992 to 2004.

過去選舉制度的研究相信,在複數選區單記非讓渡投票選制 (SNTV)的選舉,政黨與個人因素對選民的投票抉擇「應該」相當重要。然而,現有選舉行為的文獻並未就此一信念予以嚴格檢驗。本文證據顯示,雖然這兩類因素都有顯著影響,「政黨」因素遠比「個人」因素更強而有力。概括來看,在選民的投票抉擇當中,政黨因素最為關鍵;在同黨候選人之間,個人因素可用以決勝負。再者,政黨因素與個人因素也有交互作用。不同的政黨脈絡下,選民對個人因素重要與否的判斷有所不同,表面上看似屬於候選人的個人投票,其實政黨因素的考量可能影響很大。

研究方法上,本文提出混合洛基模型 (mixed logit),作為SNTV投票抉擇模型的適當統計工具,所檢驗的民調資料係針對1992年至2004年台灣五次立委選舉的調查。
Nathan Batto(鮑彤),加州大學聖地牙哥分校博士生。
Geographical Voting Bases and the Stability of Candidates’ Voter Coalitions(1989~1998)(in English)(選舉地盤:候選人票源凝聚程度之分析) 文章下載
* 本篇電子檔下載次數:7
顯示摘要
詳細內容
It is generally assumed that strong grassroots support ensures that Taiwanese legislators get support from the same voters over repeated elections. This paper attempts to test this hypothesis. We look at each candidate’s strongest areas in each election. By comparing these areas over several elections, we can search for evidence of instability in his or her vote support. In general, we find that there is far less stability in support patterns than might be expected. It is rare that all of a candidate’s strongest areas in one election are included in his or her strongest areas in subsequent elections. In other words, many legislators have been elected and re-elected with significantly different patterns of support. For the overwhelming majority of candidates, the crucial variable in determining stability is the size of their hometowns. Candidates from large townships generally have more stable support, while those from smaller townships have less stable support.

在台灣,許多研究者認為因為多數立法委員享有雄厚的基層實力,所以在不同選舉中,可獲得機乎同一批選民的支持,此篇論文即著眼於,檢證這個假設。此篇論文所採用的研究方法是分析候選人得票率最高的地區,在此地區尋找不穩定的蹟象。

大體而言,我們發現多數候選人的支持基礎並不穩定。於不同次選舉之間,候選人的地盤可能發生不少變動。換言之,有不少候選人是依賴相異的票源基礎而連任。影響候選人地盤穩定最重要的變數是候選人故鄉人口的多寡。來自較大鄉鎮市的候選人,地盤較為穩定。