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5 article(s) found.
Cheng-Hao Pao, Associate Professor, Department of Global Political Economy, Tamkang University.
Representative Behavior of Indigenous Legislator in Taiwan: A Content Analysis of the Floor Questions between 2002 and 2012 (in Chinese) Download
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This study offers a novel empirical account of the representative behavior of the indigenous legislators in the 2002 to 2012 Legislative Yuan. Based on behavioral data, the analysis seeks first to know whether the lack of descriptive representation leads to the harm of substantive representation or not, and then second to illustrate the change and continuity of the issues which indigenous legislators pay attention to. The research findings indicates that although dedicated indigenous seats are always occupied by Amis, Atayal, and Paiwan, the interests of other indigenous peoples do not be harmed. In other words, the current electoral system does not guarantee descriptive representation of all indigenous peoples but provide a substantive representation to them. Basically, the elected indigenous legislators regard themselves as representatives of all indigenous peoples. Furthermore, although the issues concerned by indigenous legislators may be influenced by constituency and party affiliation, they are still highly related to indigenous interests. Indigenous legislators in Taiwan do response to the needs of the represented.
Ching-jyuhn Luor, Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration and Policy, National Taipei University.
Wen-hsueh Chen, Doctoral Student, Department of Public Administration and Policy, National Taipei University.
The Determinants of the Distribution of Indigenous Grants in Taiwan: Ethnic Minority Representation or Electoral Competition? (in Chinese) Download
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Based on the minority representation and distributive theories, the present study investigates whether the distribution of indigenous grants in Taiwan is determined by ethnic representation in the Legislative Yuan or electoral factors.

By intuition, ethnicity-laden consideration might be the most important one in deciding the distribution of indigenous people-related benefits, in the sense that the ethnic groups represented more by the same ethnic legislators in the Legislative Yuan tend to receive more benefit than otherwise. However, statistical results in this paper show that indigenous legislators are not likely reaping disproportionate largess for the areas where their own ethnic groups account for most of the indigenous population. They care even more on others. Why? Maybe the legislators believe that simply asking votes by ethnic identification is enough so that pouring more benefits for their ethnic groups may not increase the marginal utility of the votes. They probably need extra votes from other ethnic groups for electoral safety. In addition, the statistical finding shows that disproportionate benefit goes to the higher turn-out rate areas, electoral competitive areas, and the areas where most indigenous legislators' votes are concentrated, indicating that indigenous legislators' electoral concern are more important than the ethnic one.

This paper has implications on the design of electoral system of indigenous legislators in Taiwan. For those who worry that current electoral system of indigenous legislators leads to the disadvantaged position of minority groups among indigenous people, the evidences provided in this paper possibly alleviate their anxieties.
William Tsai, Assistant Professor at Hsin-wu Coll唔e and also Shih-hsin University. He has a PhD in Politics and International Studi凹, University of Warwick (UK).
Comparing Electoral Systems for Congressional Reform (in Chinese) Download
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Calling for electoral reform is particularly harsh in the recent years, especially after President Chen announced to adopt Single-Member Constituency Parallel System for the forthcoming general elections after the Conference for Governmental Reform on 5th May 2002. Unfortunately, comparison studies on alternative methods are still few. In order to advance understandings on concerned circumstances, this article tries to analyse and compare political consequences, reform effects and feasibilities of major alternative systems, i. e. Single-Member Constituency Parallel System, Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP), Medium-Sized Constituency Parallel System, and Open-list Proportional Representation, called by different parties in the congress.
Shine-Ching Hsieh, Associate Professor in Shih Chien University.
The New Electoral System and Its Political Consequences in Japan-The 1996 Election of the House of Representatives (in Chinese) Download
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The Japanese electoral system had adopted the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). Under SNTV, three to five members were elected from each constituency based on a plurality of votes. However, a series of corruption scandals since 1988 in Japan had damaged confidence in political system. As a result, Diet passed new measures transforming the middle-size district system into a mixed-member system in January 1994, combining single-member district & PR party lists. This article introduces the reform process and the new electoral system.It was the first time that Japanese House of Representatives adopted the single-member district & PR party lists parallel system on October 20, 1996. The article is intended to describe the electoral process and analyze its political consequences.The preliminary conclusions of the study are:(1) The new electoral system in Japan is of great advantage to LDP.(2) The new electoral system didn't correct the 'money politics' and transform the electoral competition from candidate-oriented to party and policy-oriented in Japan.
Shing-Yuan Sheng, Associate Professor Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University.
Law-Making and Constituency Service: A Study on Representative Behavior of Taiwan's Legislators Elected in 1995 (in Chinese) Download
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This paper examines representative behavior of Taiwan's legislators and the reasons for their representative behavior. The representative behavior is divided into two categories: activities in the Legislative Yuan and activities in constituencies. Some researchers argue that these two categories of representative behavior are a trade-off, because legislators' resources are limited. Others argue that making efforts on one of these two categories of activities may reduce pressure from the other one. However, this paper indicates that these two arguments are not true for Taiwan's legislators. Based on a survey on legislators' assistants and a content analysis up-on Legislative gazettes, this paper shows that the relationship of these two categories of behavior is not necessarily negative. That is to say, the legislators who make efforts in the Legislative Yuan may not necessarily ignore the constituencies. On the contrary, the legislators who make efforts in the constituencies may not necessarily ignore the activities in the Legislative Yuan.Secondly, the research findings indicate that individual legislators must have some expectations on their representative roles, and hence these expectations affect their choices on legislative career, either pays more attention to law-making or to constituency services. Meanwhile, these expectations are affected by the factors related to legislators' party, constituency, and their own political purposes and resources. Furthermore, comparing these influential factors, I find that the factors related to the constituency are the most important. The legislators whose votes are concentrated on a certain part of the electoral district tend to make more efforts in constituencies. On the other hand, the legislators whose votes are scattered across the electoral district tend to make more efforts in the Legislative Yuan. Meanwhile, the research findings show that the following factors affect legislators' representative behavior: party affiliation, the degree of intra-party competition, political purposes, seniority, whether holding a party position, and the activities in committees.