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3 article(s) found.
Yi-ching Hsiao, Assistant Professor, Department of Public Administration, Tamkang University.
People's Perception of the Party Lists in Taiwan's 2008 Legislative Election and It's Effect (in Chinese) Download
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The mixed-member majoritarian system was first adopted in the 2008 legislative election in Taiwan. In accordance with this electoral system, each voter has two ballots to cast at the same time. The first ballot is for the candidates in the single member district, and the second is for the party list, which determines the seats each party receives. Theoretically, voters' decision on the second ballot depends not only on his or her party identification but also on the quality of party list. Since the two ballots system was recently adopted in 2008, most people are not familiar with the mixed-member majoritarian system. Therefore, this article attempts to examine the voters' perception of the party list and their preference, and furthermore to assess whether their perception and preference would affect their voting choice on the second ballot. The empirical survey data of TEDS2008L is analyzed in this article to answer these questions. It is found that while most voters can neither recognize the names on the lists of the two major parties nor indicate their preference among the lists. However, voters are significantly more likely to vote for the party list they recognize or prefer. This result indicates that parties should make every endeavor to enhance the quality of the party list in order to receive more votes in this newly adopted electoral system in Taiwan.
Chi Huang, Professor, Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University.
Ding-ming Wang, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University.
Ming-feng Kuo, Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University.
Straight-And Split-Ticket Voting in a Mixed-Member Majoritarian System: An Analysis of the 1996 House Election in Japan (in Chinese) Download
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The 1990s witnessed an explosion in electoral reforms, especially in adopting the ”mixed electoral systems” which combine the features of both single-member districts (SMD) and proportional representation (PR). In January 1994, the Japanese Diet passed the law that replaced the single nontransferable vote (SNTV), in use since 1947, with a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system. Voters cast two votes in this new electoral system: a candidate vote in an SMD, and a party-list vote in the list tier portion of the ballot. The 1996 House election was the first test of the MMM system in Japan. The purpose of this article is to assess the effects of this electoral system change based on the 1996 post-election survey of the Japanese Election Study (JES). We focus particularly on the straight-and split-ticket voting patterns for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and their determinants.

Our study indicates that straight-ticket rate was pretty high among the LDP supporters. That is, 80.16% of those who voted for an LDP candidate in an SMD also voted for the LDP on a party-list vote. A further analysis reveals that the LDP identifiers and the more conservative were much more likely to cast straight votes for the LDP, but on the other hand voters with college-level or higher education were less likely to do so. We also find that between two types of ticket-splitters, the percentage of voters who voted for an LDP candidate in an SMD and yet for the non-LDP on a party-list ballot was higher than those who voted the other around. This is probably due to the fact that some non-LDP party identifiers voted strategically in SMDs for the largest party's (i.e., the LDP) candidates, on the one hand, and yet voted sincerely for the non-LDP on the party-list ballot.
Jih-wen Lin, Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica.
To Lose Is to Win: The Candidate-Placement Strategy of Minor Parties under Japan's Mixed-Member Majoritarian System (in Chinese) Download
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Our intuition suggests that a mixed-member majoritarian system is unfavorable to minor parties, a situation caused by strategic voting in the single-member district races. This article argues that, exactly because of strategy voting, minor parties can participate in the single-member district competitions in exchange for the vote cast by the strategic voters in the race of the proportional representation (PR) tier. Even so, minor parties should be selective of the single-member district races to place their candidate, because strategic voting in some constituencies has been weakened by forces like clientelism. To identify the single-member districts where minor parties are most likely to place a candidate, this paper studies Japan's four House of Representatives elections held under the mixed-member majoritarian system. The major finding is that, at the district level, the number of candidates increases with the tendency of strategic voting, the degree of urbanization, and the average district magnitude of PR competition; it is negatively associated with the existence of second-generation candidates and the seniority of the winner. These results confirm the hypothesis about the candidate-placement strategy of minor parties, and explain why minor parties do not nominate candidates indiscriminately as some contamination effects theories expect. Since Japan's PR seats are elected in 11 blocks, minor parties can easily spot the areas where they can attract the compensatory votes. That is why minor parties in Taiwan, which used the same electoral system for the recent legislative election but had all PR seats allocated on a nationwide list, did not follow the Japanese strategy to boost their PR votes.