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3 article(s) found.
Chiung-ju Huang, Associate Professor, Department of Public Finance, Feng Chia University.
Yuan-hong Ho, Professor, Department of Public Finance, Feng Chia University.
Tzu-yin Lin, MA, Department of Public Finance, Feng Chia University.
Elections, Checks and Balances and the Allocation of Public Expenditure: An Empirical Analysis of Local Government in Taiwan (in Chinese) Download
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Previous empirical work on political budget cycles focused solely on the dynamics of overall budget, and implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy. This study goes beyond traditional political budget cycles models and shed light on the case study of 21 local governments in Taiwan over the 1984-2009 periods.

To explore how the level of checks and balances can explain the size of the political budget cycles, the political constraints index for the 21 local governments in Taiwan province is developed following the coding procedure of Henisz(2005). The law and order index from the International Country Risk Guide are used to measure compliance with the law. The proxy for effective checks and balances on executive discretionary power over the 1984 to 2009 period are established with the combination of the political constraints index and the law and order index. The impacts of elections, checks and balances on the allocation of local public expenditures over the period of 1984 to 2009 are then explored by using the generalized method of moments developed for dynamic models of the panel data of Taiwan's 21 local governments.

The empirical results show that the government would indeed adjust the budget expenditures contents to achieve their goals in the election period. Such as, the deletion of the general government budget expenditures towards the social welfare expenditure budget. By incorporating effective legislative checks and balances into the model, the effect of political budget cycles can indeed be moderated or counteracted. Regardless of whether the local government has discretion or not, it does not affect the checks and balances ability of the legislature.
Chung-Ii Wu, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National Chung Cheng University.
Hung-chung Wang, Graduate Student, Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University.
The Psychological Cognition for Divided Government and Electoral Stability in Taiwan: The Cases of the 2000 Presidential and 2001 Legislative Yuan Elections (in Chinese) Download
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The phenomenon of divided government seemingly has become the institutional norm at the various levels of governments in Taiwan. In view of its theoretically and practically political implications, we focus on the causes of divided government in Taiwan’ s national politics. Put it simply, we examine the contending perspectives: the voters prefer the system of checks and balances by divided partisan control of the executive and legislative branches, and intentionally votes for presidential and congressional candidates of different political parties; or, the electoral choice may have little to do with public preferences for divided or unified government but is heavily influenced by other determinants. We take advantage of the 2001 Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS 2001) survey data of the general preference for divided government and examine if vote choice is on the basis of strategic considerations in the 2000 presidential and 2001 Legislative Yuan elections. The findings indicate that the variables of ethnicity, party identification, Taiwanese/Chinese identification, and the cognition for checks and balances emerge as statistically significant for accounting electoral stability/change and for the existence of divided government at the central level.
Sheng-Mao Hsu, Ph. D Student, Department of Political Science, National Cheng-Chi University.
Ticket Splitting: The 1998 Taipei City Mayoral Election (in Chinese) Download
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Split ticket voting by New Party identifiers and Mainlanders had a crucial influence on the outcome of the 1998 Taipei City mayoral election. Large numbers of voters who identified themselves as New Party support­ers voted for the KMT mayoral candidate. However, in the concurrent City Council elections, they voted for New Party candidates. This sur­prising result is worth researching.

To analyze split ticket voting behavior, we consider six different logit models. After controlling basic demographic variables, including sex, age, education, and ethnic background, it is possible to discover what in­fluences split ticket voting. First, weakening party identification can in­duce a dealignment process. This, in turn, gives rise to split ticket voting. In the data, the intensity of party identification has an obvious ef­fect on split ticket voting. However, there has been no dealignment. Thus, weakening party identification is not the main reason for split tick­et voting. The second factor is ethnic background. Mainlanders, especial­ly young and middle aged voters, are more likely to split their tickets. Third, the related questions of unification or independence and Taiwanese or Chinese identification also have influence. The effect of the unification/independence position is not significant, but the respondents ' ethnic identity is. A fourth finding is that there is no significant coattail effect influencing split ticket voting. Fifth, many voters wish to balance the parties against each other, and so they split their votes. Sixth, strategic voting by New Party supporters was very important. New Party supporters were very opposed to Chen Shui-bian, and the New Party nominee did not have much chance of winning. As a result, many split their votes, voting strategically for the KMT mayoral candidate.

After examining the six models, we find that the most important fac­tors influencing split ticket voting are ethnic background and strategic voting by New Party supporters. These two factors are intimately con­nected, of course .