All Issues

2 article(s) found.
Eric Chen-hua Yu, Assistant Research Fellow, Election Study Center; Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science,
National Chengchi University.
The Impact of President's Performance on Taiwan's Local Elections - Analyzing the 2009 Magistrate Elections (in Chinese) Download
* Downloads: 42
Show abstract
Full content
Taiwan's ruling party, Kuomintang (KMT), handed a loss to the opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in the 2009 Magistrate Elections. The conventional wisdom suggests two competing arguments to interpret the election results-while some argued that the KMT's loss was mainly due to the lack of partisan mobilization within the KMT, some posited that it was because a significant proportion of voters changed their voting preferences from the KMT to the DPP between the 2008 national and 2009 local elections.In fact, both arguments share the same premise: there exists a linkage between the performance of the ruling party (in the central government) and its electoral prospect in local elections. Specifically, the performance of President Ma has a substantial impact on the 2009 local election. This study utilizes survey data to verify such premise. Our data analysis shows that a voter's assessments on President Ma's job performance as well as on general and personal economic conditions affect his/her voting intention. In other words, we found that the ”referendum voting model,” in which voters caste their votes in midterm elections on a basis of their evaluations of the ruling party, properly explains voting behavior in Taiwan's midterm elections such as the 2009 local elections.
Eric Chen-hua Yu, Assistant Research Fellow, Election Study Center; Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science,
National Chengchi University.
From State Legislatures to Congress: Exploring the Effect of Legislative Professionalism on State Legislators' Career Paths in the United States (in Chinese) Download
* Downloads: 16
Show abstract
Full content
This essay explores the extent to which legislative professionalism alters state legislators’ career paths to Congress in the United States. Using cross-sectional data for sixteen Congresses in the period from 1974 to 2004, I argue that the likelihood of advancement to the House of Representatives for state legislators is a quadratic function of legislative professionalism measured by legislative salary. Furthermore, there exists a critical level of legislative salary that maximizes this function. At this critical level, the marginal effect of legislative professionalism on the likelihood of advancement to the House for state legislators goes to zero. Additionally, the effect of state legislative professionalism on the likelihood of advancement to the House for state legislators does not differ significantly for Democrats and Republicans.