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2 article(s) found.
Ching-jyuhn Luor, Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration and Policy, National Taipei University.
Wen-hsueh Chen, Doctoral Student, Department of Public Administration and Policy, National Taipei University.
The Determinants of the Distribution of Indigenous Grants in Taiwan: Ethnic Minority Representation or Electoral Competition? (in Chinese) Download
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Based on the minority representation and distributive theories, the present study investigates whether the distribution of indigenous grants in Taiwan is determined by ethnic representation in the Legislative Yuan or electoral factors.

By intuition, ethnicity-laden consideration might be the most important one in deciding the distribution of indigenous people-related benefits, in the sense that the ethnic groups represented more by the same ethnic legislators in the Legislative Yuan tend to receive more benefit than otherwise. However, statistical results in this paper show that indigenous legislators are not likely reaping disproportionate largess for the areas where their own ethnic groups account for most of the indigenous population. They care even more on others. Why? Maybe the legislators believe that simply asking votes by ethnic identification is enough so that pouring more benefits for their ethnic groups may not increase the marginal utility of the votes. They probably need extra votes from other ethnic groups for electoral safety. In addition, the statistical finding shows that disproportionate benefit goes to the higher turn-out rate areas, electoral competitive areas, and the areas where most indigenous legislators' votes are concentrated, indicating that indigenous legislators' electoral concern are more important than the ethnic one.

This paper has implications on the design of electoral system of indigenous legislators in Taiwan. For those who worry that current electoral system of indigenous legislators leads to the disadvantaged position of minority groups among indigenous people, the evidences provided in this paper possibly alleviate their anxieties.
Ching-Jyuhn Luor, Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration, Tamkang University.
Ron S. Wahn, Lecturer, Department of Business Management, Ming Hsing Institute of Technology.
Elections and the Geographic Distribution of Grants: Political Manipulation or Equalizing Local Finance? (in Chinese) Download
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The present study explores whether the geographic distribution of grants among counties and cities, offered by the Taiwan Provincial Government (TPG) from FY1988 to FY1995, is aiming at equalizing local finance or manipulating elections. Specifically, we ask if the size of grants during the election years is larger than non-election years? We also ask whether the decision regarding the distribution of grants made by the Taiwan Provincial Government is contingent upon the consideration of electoral success of the ruling party KMT? That is, under the command of the ruling party KMT, does the TPG offer disproportionate grants to the most vulnerable districts regardless of the objective needs?Briefly, statistical results show that the size of provincial grants during the election years is larger than non-election years. The results also show that the disproportionate provincial grants do flow to KMT's vulnerable districts in the election of the Taiwan Provincial Legislators and the election of county in chief and city mayor, but not in the election of Lawmakers of the Legislative Yuan. These findings suggest that, in addition to maintaining the KMT's partisan advantaged position, the TPG distributes disproportionate benefits to vulnerable districts based on political considerations of its own. First, the budget security of the TPG is dependent on the Taiwan Provincial Legislators. Thus, helping candidates of provincial legislators who are most vulnerable to be elected or reelected by distributing provincial grants to his or her districts may exchange future support of provincial legislators. Second, the TPG needs the cooperation of city government and county government in policy implementation. Hence, the TPG expect to bring partnership of local governments in the future if the TPG offers assistant expenditures for those incumbents of city mayor or county in chief who are most vulnerable in the election.Finally, although we find clear evidences of political manipulation in the distribution of Taiwan provincial grants, the objective criteria-capacity of self-financing still plays an important role in the decision of grant distribution. We find that the counties or cities with low capacity of self-financing receive more grants than those with high capacity of self-financing. In other words, electoral consideration may exist in the distribution of provincial grants, yet equalizing local finance is still not ignored in the decision process.